No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than the cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers. [1]

Halbwachs spoke of the non-linear development of collective memory, when a sense of reality is inseparable from real life. And social groups and their interests shape the perception of the past.[2] Hobsbawm explained the orientation of collective memory to the present because society strives for historical continuity. He suggested that political and social changes occur through the “invention” of new rituals and symbols. These symbols can be reused to legitimize government political and military actions.[3] Putin’s rise to power ushered in a brutal era of politicization and memory manipulation. In his inaugural speech on May 7, 2000, he stated:

“...there is the concentration of our national memory in the Kremlin. Here, within it’s walls, the history of our country was made, and we have no right to be Ivans who do not remember kinship. We must not forget anything, and we must know our history. Know  it as it was, learn from it. We should  remember those who created the Russian state, defended its dignity, made it a great, powerful, mighty state. We will preserve this memory and maintain this connection of times… I consider it my sacred duty to unite the people of Russia, to gather citizens together around clear goals and objectives. And to remember during every day of serving the fatherland: we have one homeland, one people. You and I have one common future ahead”.[4]

His rhetoric was built around the inextricable link between modern Russia and its “thousand-year” history, thereby legitimizing the Putin regime as the legitimate historical successor to both the Russian Empire and the USSR. The “unity” of citizens was the national idea, which was formed on widely recognizable, positively, and unambiguously perceived symbols and rituals.[5] According to the Levada Center survey about World War II in 2003, 84% of Russian families had or were participants in the Great Patriotic War, and 80-85% of citizens celebrated Victory Day.[6] In a 2006 survey, “What date should be celebrated as the main public holiday?” 57% answered – May 9th.[7] In the complex and ambiguous context of the events of the last century and the context of Yeltsin’s electoral policy of alienation from the Soviet past, Victory Day and the Great Patriotic War became the main and only possible symbols of the unification of society, from which the Putin's regime formed the national idea.

The Search for National Identity

The collapse of the USSR gave rise to the search for a national identity for the newly formed Russia. On July 30, 1996, in issue No. 142 of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta, under the heading “Who are we? Where are we going?” there was a small announcement on the main page about the competition called “The Idea of Russia”. Everyone who “believed in a reviving Russia, talent, diligence, and patriotism of Russians” and who was ready to present a nationwide unifying idea of Russia in 5-7 pages was invited to participate. They proposed to send such ideas to the editorial office of the newspaper with the note “The idea for Russia”. The newspaper promised to reward the author of the best idea with ten million rubles.[8] This competition was published in the official newspaper of the Government of the Russian Federation precisely 27 days after Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential election, which was characterized by a manipulative informational campaign in his support.

The collapse of the USSR and subsequent events did not launch a radical rethinking of Soviet history, a redefinition of morality and social relations. They did not lead to lustration on the territory of Russia. The myths formed by the Soviet past did not disappear completely. They were fixed in a hybrid form, with the rejection of some historical aspects and the consolidation of others. The leaders of the Communist Party continued to use the slogan “For our Soviet Motherland” while at the same time declaring that they were not “the party of Trotsky and Beria, Vlasov and Yakovlev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin”.[9] The democrats, having initially abandoned patriotic myth-making due to associations with communist propaganda, failed to build a new narrative around the events of the 1991 putsch and “freedom”. In the end, when they realized they were about to lose their power, they partially returned to celebrating the positive aspects of the Soviet past. Political actors, pursuing their goals, mobilized the familiar Soviet collective memory, seeking to unite citizens around the symbolism of the past.

Yeltsin and the Russian government attempted to mythologize new potentially popular historical symbols that could shape Russian identity. For example, one of the significant events was the putsch in August 1991 and the victory over the putschists. In the beginning, the myth of the “overthrowing of the junta” revolved around honoring three people who died during the coup. A memorial stone was installed in their honor, the citizens who participated in the opposition were awarded medals, and the square in front of the White House was renamed Freedom Square. However, the celebration of the victory over the putschists turned into an indistinct “Day of the Russian flag”. The Day of Independence of Russia was timed to coincide with the proclamation of state sovereignty by the RSFSR on June 12th, 1990. It raised questions in the wording since it was unclear from whom Russia wanted to be independent, being the “main” Soviet republic.  The adoption of the constitution of the Russian Federation on December 12th, 1993, also did not become an official public holiday due to the lack of parliamentary support. None of the new holidays were popular among the citizens, and none of the citizens participated in them.[10]

In parallel with the failures in the new mythology, the celebration of the October Revolution remained the official holiday of the communists, and Victory Day was an important day for all citizens. While the democrats completely denied the holiday around  the revolution, May 9 was not so unambiguous and required the adaptation of Soviet patriotic myths to the realities of democratic Russia. The critical narrative of the democrats revolved around the fact that the victory over fascism was a deed of the people not because of, but despite Stalin and the party. On May 9, 1992, instead of a military parade on Red Square, there was a procession of veterans not only from the former Soviet republics but also from the United States, where former prisoners of concentration camps also took part.[11] The Communists accused the Democrats of neglecting the holiday, that the German band marched with the veterans, and that they downplayed the national victory and killed the spirit of patriotism. The celebration of Victory Day has become a competition between communists and democrats. By 1995, the Yeltsin government realized the holiday’s impact on patriotism, especially in an unstable economy. The celebration returned to Red Square, and the parade of military equipment was held on Poklonnaya Hill. In addition, the rituals of the parade remained the same as in the USSR: the leader is on top of the mausoleum, and the Minister of Defense is driving around the soldiers in a car while they shout “Hurrah”. For the first time, the Soviet and Russian flags were officially placed together. On May 19, 1995, Yeltsin signed the law “On Perpetuating the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War,” in which Victory Day was declared a national holiday and a non-working day with an annual military parade. Along with this, responsibility for the preservation of monuments and memorial structures was introduced. There were several resolutions as well: fight against fascism on the territory of the Russian Federation, bans on the public identification of the USSR with Nazi Germany, and on the denial of the decisive role of the Soviet people in winning the war.[12] A partial return to the Soviet rituals of celebrating May 9 and the consolidation of the special status of the Great Patriotic War at the legislative level marked the beginning of the institutionalization of the collective memory of this historical event.

Institutionalization of the collective memory of the Great Patriotic War

Although Putin officially voiced patriotism as a national idea only in 2016, the institutionalization of historical memory and patriotic education began in 2001. Five state programs for the Patriotic education of Russian citizens – 2001–2005 (funding 177.95 million rubles), 2006–2010 (funding 497.8 million rubles), 2011–2015 (funding 777.2 million rubles), 2016–2020 (funding 1718.6915 million rubles), 2021–2025 (funding amount not published) — were approved by law. The program affected different age and social groups and the family structure  as the primary unit of society. Political and social goals were aimed at consolidating the society around patriotic ideas, strengthening the state’s image among the population, and increasing the educational impact of Russian culture, art, and education on the formation of patriotism. Raising the prestige of the military and public service, the construction  of people  loyal to their  motherland and ready to fulfill their duty to protect its interestswas brought into a separate category.